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Abstract: 
Internationally, there has been a steady increase in the number of countries instigating charity 
regulation. Public interest theory suggests that regulation increases organizational transparency 
through reducing information asymmetry, protects (or encourages) a competitive market, and leads 
to a distribution of resources which is in the public interest. While these arguments may explain charity 
regulation, the cost of compliance can be an issue for small and medium-sized charities. Therefore 
regulators tend to take a light-handed approach to small and medium charities' information provision. 
This paper ascertains the impact of a light-handed enforcement regime on small and medium charities' 
reporting, analysing the financial reporting practices of a selection of 300 small and medium-sized 
charities registered with the former New Zealand Charities Commission against the Charities Act 2005 
requirements and hence the rationale for this regulator. It uses this analysis to predict how the 
regulator's activities might impact future reporting practices of charities. 
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Regulating small and medium charities: does it improve transparency and 
accountability? 
 
1. Introduction 
Internationally, there has been a steady increase in the number of countries instigating charity 
regulation. As examples of independent regulators, the Charity Commission for England and Wales 
(CCEW) arose from arrangements that date back to the Charitable Trusts Acts of 18531 with more 
recent entrants being the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator (OSCR) (2003), the New Zealand’s 
Charities Commission (2005), the Singaporean Charity Council (2007), the Charity Commission for 
Northern Ireland (2008) and the Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission (ACNC) (2012). 
In other countries (such as Canada and the United States (US)) tax authorities register and monitor 
charitable activity. Charity watchdogs have also established in recent years. These include GuideStar 
in the US, United Kingdom (UK), India and now globally, and the Better Business Bureau’s Wise Giving 
Alliance which reports on national and some regional charities in the US. As Szper and Prakash (2011, 
p.116) note “there is a perception, correct or incorrect, that nonprofits have transparency issues” and 
therefore that regulation is required to improve charities' transparency and accountability. The 
exemption from income tax enjoyed by charities and the donee concessions afforded by many 
registered charities are also reasons for regulation. 
Public interest theory suggests that regulation increases transparency through reducing information 
asymmetry, protects (or encourages) a competitive market and leads to a distribution of resources 
which is in the public interest (Gaffikin, 2005). While these arguments are commonly used to call for 
regulation in the private (for-profit) sphere, nonetheless they may explain some of the increase in the 
number of charity regulators.  
                                                             
1  The 1853 Act appointed Commissioners, with the name change to CCEW being enacted by the Charities 
Act 2006, Section 6. 
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For example due to the lack of ‘owners’, information asymmetry gives rise to the potential for 
opportunism in charities and other nonprofit organizations (Desai & Yetman, 2005). In addition, 
Weisbrod (1989) notes that these organizations’ managers have less incentive to be efficient than 
managers of for-profit businesses, and therefore require greater monitoring of their financial and 
social performance. These precepts derived from agency theory point to the need for both internal 
and external monitoring. In respect of external monitoring, Desai and Yetman (2005) found that US 
regulatory requirements for charities to return financial information leads to lower compensation of 
officers and directors and thus, maximises funds available for charitable distribution.2  Regulating for 
increased charity information may therefore build the donating public's trust and confidence 
(Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009).  
Notwithstanding a need for regulation, parsimony is an important aspect of good regulation (Simon, 
1995), that is, regulation should not be heavier than necessary to achieve its aim. While regulators 
therefore require large charities to comply with minimum reporting standards, they tend to take a 
light-handed approach to small and medium charities' information provision for the sake of parsimony 
(for example, Hind, 2011; Morgan, 2010). 
Recent articles in this Journal have focused on regulation of charitable funding (Barber, 2012; Breen, 
2012; Phillips, 2012) – a subset of the issue of charity regulation, however this special issue considers 
the regulation of charities’ financial reporting. Responding to the call by Hyndman and McDonnell 
(2009) for research into charities regulation, its rationale and operation, the objective of this paper is 
to ascertain the impact of a light-handed enforcement regime on small and medium charities' 
reporting. In so doing, it analyses the financial reporting practices of a selection of charities registered 
with the former New Zealand Charities Commission against the Charities Act requirements, and hence 
                                                             
2  This is despite the limited public access of US returns. Interested parties must request copies of filings from 
the charities rather than being able to download them from a central register. Nevertheless, for larger 
entities, Better Business Bureau’s Wise Giving and GuideStar facilitate information access and commentary.  
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the rationale for this regulator.3 It uses this analysis to predict how the regulator's activities might 
impact future filing practices of charities. 
The paper proceeds as follows: first the rationale for charities' regulation and reporting is provided 
and tested against the oldest charity regulator (the CCEW). In section three the New Zealand context 
is described and the research design presented. Following the research results, the paper continues 
with a discussion and conclusion, including limitations and opportunities for further research. 
2. Regulation in the charities sector 
2.1 The impetus to regulate 
A number of theories of regulation and the contextually and temporally specific nature of the need  
for and the imposition of regulation make discussions of regulation complex (Gaffikin, 2005). Stigler 
(1971) argues that government regulation can be a means to protect the public from the failures of 
self- or no- regulation. His public interest theory addresses concerns that private interest will outweigh 
the public interest in business operations and that, due to information asymmetry, regulation is 
needed to protect the public interest. Public interest theory suggests a regulator will facilitate 
activities in the private sphere to: (i) address information asymmetries in a manner equitable both to 
the regulated (preparer of the information) and to the users of the information, and (ii) to maintain 
an environment which encourages competition and fair distribution of resources (Gaffikin, 2005). 
Within such a regime, regulators are expected to set minimum standards, increase the amount of 
publicly available information and enhance comparability across entities (Brown, 1990). This will occur 
when the publicly available information is of sufficient quality and credibility.  
Public interest arguments may also be adapted to explain regulation in the private charity sphere. In 
this sector, high information asymmetry exists due to the prevalence of unreciprocated (non-exchange) 
                                                             
3  Since 1 July 2012, the once independent Charities Commission has been replaced and the regulator is 
now within the Department of Internal Affairs. A three member Board has taken over the prior 
Commissioners’ functions in respect of making decisions about registering and deregistering charities. 
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contributions to charities (Weisbrod, 1989) and due to the lack of ownership (Desai & Yetman, 2005). 
There is a great diversity of users and, for example, the UK Charities Act 2011 requires the CCEW to 
(amongst others) 'inspire public trust and confidence in charities' and to 'enhance the accountability 
of charities to donors, beneficiaries and the general public'. The CCEW enhances accountability by 
careful attention to information asymmetries of these users (donors, beneficiaries and the general 
public) and reports that public trust and confidence in charities continues to increase (Hind, 2011). 
Notwithstanding regulators’ intentions to enhance accountability, incidences of fraud continue to 
occur as shown by Fremont and Kosaras (2003). Further, poor reporting by charities leads to a lack of 
transparency (as shown in section 2.3). 
Regulation may also be developed to maintain competition in certain markets (Gaffikin, 2005). 
Competition is encouraged due to the belief that scarce resources will be distributed effectively and 
efficiently amongst those who pay for a market-provided service or good and the providing 
organizations. Further, regulation within a competitive market can lead to more just distribution of 
resources (Gaffikin, 2005). Potentially this rhetoric of the efficient market may be observed in charity 
regulation. For example, the UK Charities Act 2011 requires the CCEW to (amongst others) 'promote 
the effective use of charitable resources'. The manner in which the CCEW makes  information available 
about large charities on its website, and the UK government's sponsorship of an information website 
(GuideStar) (see Dhanani, 2009) provide evidence of the regulator's desire to encourage competition 
in the charities market which may also lead to the more fair distribution of resources throughout the 
sector. This is all the more important, suggest Hyndman and McMahon (2011), due to the increasing 
amounts of government funding into the charities sector (especially for social services delivery). Hind 
(2011) also notes that a role of the CCEW has been to promote public interest in charity, and this also 
speaks of the creation of a public market.  
Yet, the term 'public interest' may be ill-defined and these theories do not sufficiently consider the 
competence and independence of the regulator (Gaffikin, 2005). This is not such an issue in the charity 
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case, as the public interest has been defined by statute ('promoting public trust and confidence in 
charities'), although it is recognised that robustly measuring trust and confidence can be difficult.  
Public interest theory explains why industries might have regulation thrust upon it, however Stigler 
(1971) also discusses private interest theory, where industries actively seek regulation. This second 
rationale is useful in considering some regulatory frameworks (for example, Phillips, 2012 discusses 
the Canadian case), however it does not appear to explain the rise of New Zealand charity regulation 
(the context of this research). Indeed, self-regulation in the charities sector has occurred infrequently 
and has experienced only limited success (Cordery & Baskerville, 2007; Phillips, 2012). Cordery and 
Baskerville (2007) note that when the New Zealand Government consulted on the need or otherwise 
for a Charities Commission (in its 'Tax and Charities' review of 2001) a majority of the 1682 submissions 
supported or accepted the need for an external regulator of the charitable sector, rather than arguing 
for self-regulation.  
An issue with self-regulation is regulatory capture, due to a lack of independence (perceived or 
otherwise) (Gaffikin, 2005). The vision of the CCEW notes it is to be 'the independent regulator for 
charitable activity...' Its independence ensures that interest groups (including government, charities 
themselves and, to a lesser extent the public) cannot capture the regulator. Independence also means 
that the regulator will sanction a charity’s short-comings by de-registration and, in extreme cases, 
convictions through the court process. Thus, the regulator's process needs to be open, transparent, 
accountable and acceptable.  
Charities’ regulators tend to use compliance approaches to encourage and educate charities rather 
than enforcing requirements through deterrence approaches. A compliance approach is flexible and 
less confrontational (Gaffikin, 2005), as can be observed with the CCEW which viewed its role in the 
early 21st century, as "being akin to regulating angels" (Hind, 2011, p. 202). The benefits of a 
compliance approach are that regulation can be carried out more efficiently and therefore with less 
cost. Yet, compliance approaches are more susceptible to being captured by interest groups and may 
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lead to a lack of sufficient regulatory resources (Gaffikin, 2005). Compliance monitoring is evident 
from the manner in which charities regulators assume an education role.  
Regulation requires charities to disclose financial and also non-financial information about the 
difference they make within communities to meet users’ needs for accountability and for information 
to make decisions about future donations and relationships with charities. Users of charities’ reports 
are diverse and their needs are potentially varied. In the United Kingdom (UK), Bird and Morgan-Jones 
(1981) asserted that there are six user types. The New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants’ 
(2007) Not-for-Profit Financial Reporting Guide lists 13 different users who could rely on charities' 
financial reports for information. Users may be internal (for example, staff, board members and 
volunteers) or external, providing resources to the organization, and/or seeking accountability for 
external support by way of various fiscal concessions. No doubt a number of these users were 
responsible for the 14 million ‘hits’ on the New Zealand Charities register during the 2010 calendar 
year.4  
2.2 Arguments against regulation 
Notwithstanding, some users will seek information elsewhere than a public register and may argue 
that regulation is not required. For other donors the 'warm glow' of giving (Andreoni, 1998) will be 
sufficient, making them less likely to make enquiries as to charities' performance. Hyndman and 
McDonnell (2009) suggest that donors to street collections are likely to be in this category. Other users 
may be able to demand special purpose reports from a charity (for example, philanthropic trusts 
making grants) (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009).  
Further, charities perceive regulation in general, and financial regulation in particular, to be a burden 
(Burt & Taylor, 2004). As well as the direct and indirect costs of regulation, some charities may not be 
aware of regulatory requirements, and others may lack expertise (Burt & Taylor, 2004). For example, 
                                                             
4   Information retrieved from the Charities Commission February/March newsletter 2011 downloaded from 
http://www.charities.govt.nz/news/newsletter/2011-03/ 1 March 2013. 
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research following the passing of the Charities Act 1993 in England and Wales, found its imposition of 
reporting requirements led to a number of charities' volunteer administrators and treasurers leaving 
their jobs (Morgan, 2008).  
The benefits charities and the public receive from reporting to a standard must outweigh the costs. 
Although large charities are often professionalised and likely to meet (and exceed) reporting 
requirements (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009), conversely, small charities may utilise their community 
links to communicate success, rather than formal financial reports. In respect of the CCEW, Fries (2003) 
explained they required a framework to encourage transparent reporting that was commensurate to 
the charity's size and also the public interest. Hind (2011) confirmed that the CCEW sought to take 
into account the regulatory burden on smaller charities and simplified its forms and reduced disclosure 
requirements for small and medium-sized charities. Yet, costs of information preparation are difficult 
to measure and the economic benefits of enhanced information is even more so (Brown, 1990). 
Further, charity regulators may operate unsuccessfully when they do not have clear policy goals 
(Breen, 2009). Breen (2009) and Phillips (2012), in their analyses of fundraising regulation, note that a 
number of models could be used and that specific models may work best at different stages of the 
fundraising process. Extrapolating Breen’s (2009) concern about policy goals to charity regulation in 
general suggests that, unless the regulator has considered the consequences of its actions, charities 
may bear regulatory costs unnecessarily.   
Simon (1995) argues that, in response to poor regulation, governments may practise de-regulatory 
activities, for example providing ad hoc relief from regulation and turning a blind eye to charities’ 
trespasses. Yet, he further notes that when charity regulators move to reduce the cost of regulation 
(especially reporting requirements), lawless activity can ensue. Charity reporting practice has been 
shown to be deficient, with shortcomings in charities’ financial reports being highlighted in, for 
example, the UK and North America as shown in the following section. Further, while the development 
of charity-specific standards to guide charity preparers has advanced in England and Wales (Hind, 
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2011), it remains underdeveloped in other countries, such as New Zealand (Cordery & Baskerville, 
2007). 
2.3 Charity-specific reporting in the UK and North America 
2.3.1 United Kingdom 
From 1960 English and Welsh charities were legally required to file financial reports, yet Bird and 
Morgan- Jones (1981) found that charity reporting was extremely diverse, leading to reduced charity 
transparency and accountability. During this period the CCEW’s predecessor lacked resources and the 
accounting framework was not charity-specific. While initially they had supported diversity in practice, 
Bird and Morgan-Jones (1981) found such severe inconsistencies in charity financial reports, that they 
argued strongly for founding principles to be established and regulation to encourage compliance.  
From 1988 a Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP) could be used by charities to prepare their 
financial reports. However, a decade after its release, Williams and Palmer (1998) explained that 
charities were ignorant of the SORP, while Palmer and Vinten (1998) and Connolly and Hyndman (2001) 
confirmed that poor financial reporting was in effect encouraged by the failure of auditors to issue 
qualified audit reports on non-compliant financial reports. Alternatively, Hines and Jones (1992) 
argued that the voluntary nature of reporting was the most likely reason for non-compliance and poor 
reporting practices. While complying with the SORP remains voluntary for smaller charities (with 
income <£25,000), it became mandatory from 1992 for medium and large charities, and this 
eventually drove compliance (Hyndman & McMahon, 2011). Further, the SORP is regularly updated 
to ensure it does not digress too markedly from UK GAAP as it is applied to the public sector, given 
the similarity of these organizations to charities (Hyndman & McMahon, 2011) and to ensure 
comparability.  
The CCEW continues to have very little resource to undertake detailed checking of charities’ filings. 
Morgan (2011) noted that problems with financial reports, including the use of different versions of 
the SORP, means that financial statements are not comparable across different charities, or from year 
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to year for the same charity. The CCEW also requires a range of non-financial reporting, including a 
Trustees Annual Report and, since April 2008, a report on the extent to which the charity has 
undertaken activities to accomplish its objectives for the public benefit. Recent research by Morgan 
and Fletcher (2011) highlighted severe inadequacies with charities’ (non-financial) reporting of their 
achievements in this respect. Such poor financial and non-financial reporting is likely to undermine 
the publics' confidence and result in fewer donations to charities, and potentially jeopardise 
government funding into the sector (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009).  
In Scotland, the OSCR regularly undertakes a comparative study into ‘small charity accounts’ using a 
sample of 300 charities with income under £25,000.5 In the most recent study, they found that one in 
six charities produce financial reports which omit total income, expenditure and/or the resultant 
surplus or deficit. Approximately one in three charities files non-compliant balance sheets (OSCR, 
2010), although Morgan (2010) notes that, if they do not balance, the OSCR rejects the whole filing 
(the financial report and the Trustees Annual Report).  
It appears that, despite the increasing demand for transparency and accountability, there remain a 
number of issues in charity reporting and governance in the UK (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009). Users 
of financial statements of North American charities (and nonprofit organizations generally) also find 
poor quality reporting.  
2.3.1 North America  
Early research in the United States (US) by Froelich and Knoepfle (1996) compared charities' financial 
reports with their Internal Revenue Service (IRS) filing.6 Froelich and Knoepfle (1996) noted that the 
most frequent misstatement was in the expense categories, where organizations shifted salaries to 
Cost of Goods Sold in order to understate administration expenses. However other significant errors 
occur in defining fundraising expenses. From interview data they found that errors in filing of the IRS 
                                                             
5  There are approximately 25,000 charities in total registered with the OSCR. 
6  Charities are defined under s.501(c)(3) of the code, may receive contributions that qualify for income tax 
deductions, and are regulated by the IRS.  
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Form 990 were a result of organizations’ lack of understanding of regulators’ guidelines.7 Further, 
while financial statements were quite often prepared by accounting firms, the IRS Form 990 was filed 
by the organization itself and errors indicated a lack of understanding of the financial statements 
within the organization.  
Keating and Frumkin (2003) note that nonprofit organizations’ filing of their IRS Form 990 is seldom 
checked by the regulator (around 1.3% of filings were checked in 1999). Further, filings are typically 
one to two years out of date and contain “high rates of mathematical errors, transposed digits, 
omitted information and information inserted on the wrong lines” (Keating & Frumkin, 2003, p.7). 
Overall, a significant minority of filings omit important documents. Keating and Frumkin (2003) 
highlight the difficulties of requiring organizations to fill out a form (such as the Form 990) that does 
not comply with core accounting principles and requires extrapolation from financial reports into a 
number of pre-defined categories.  
The relevance of Form 990 for users of financial statements was also raised by Froelich, Knoepfle and 
Pollak (2000). However, their study found higher levels of reliability of the totals in filed data than 
Keating and Frumkin (2003) and Froelich and Knoepfle (1996). Froelich et al. (2000) stated that balance 
sheet items were correct 99% of the time, income statements 90% of the time and that minor errors 
(+/- 10%) were unimportant. Interestingly, they found that small nonprofit organizations filed 
correctly more often than large organizations. This appeared to be related to the inherent relative lack 
of complexity. Notwithstanding the errors, Desai and Yetman (2005) noted that requiring charities to 
file the Form 990 effectively ensured that they did not overspend charitable donations on internal 
compensation.  
In a study of charities that submit financial reports for reporting awards in Canada, Salterio and 
Legresley (2010) identified that organizations with the greatest problems in developing transparent 
                                                             
7  In Australia, the National Standard Chart of Accounts has been developed with a taxonomic data dictionary 
for accounting elements which may ameliorate this issue for financial statements filed with the ACNC.  
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annual reports were those with revenue between CAN$1 million and CAN$10 million. They 
hypothesised that charities in this range had a small number of staff but that they lacked the expertise 
to undertake a complex reporting process. Smaller organizations may well have used volunteers to 
develop their annual report, but their organizations were less complex and therefore the reports were 
more easily prepared.  
This research has shown that larger organizations tend to report more transparently and meet 
regulators' demands more easily than small or medium-sized charities. Some research suggests that 
small charities also meet demands better than medium-sized charities due to their simple nature (Burt 
& Taylor, 2004; Froelich et al., 2000; Salterio & Legresley, 2010). However, the relative lack of expertise 
in small and medium-sized charities (Froelich & Knoepfle, 1996) and the voluntary nature of filing  
(Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009) may reduce the transparency of both small and medium-sized charities.  
With this in mind, the objective of this paper is to analyse how a relatively new regulator balanced its 
regulatory mandate with the need for parsimony and recognising poor reporting by small and 
medium-sized charities internationally.  
3. New Zealand - an emergent regulator 
Calls for a charity regulator in New Zealand pre-date the Charities Act 2005 by almost two decades 
(Cordery & Baskerville, 2007) leading to a Charities Commission operating from early 2007. Unlike the 
UK which has codified 13 charitable purposes, New Zealand chose to retain the four principal divisions 
of charity to define what entities could be registered: “whether it relates to the relief of poverty, the 
advancement of education or religion, or any other matter beneficial to the community (Charities Act, 
2005, s.5(1)).8   
Registration in New Zealand is voluntary, but charities will register in order to benefit from tax-
                                                             
8  Section 5(2) and (2A) further note that if a trust’s beneficiaries, or a society’s or institution’s members 
are related by blood, they may still retain its charitable purpose; that marae are charitable if on Maori 
reservation land and that the promotion of amateur sport may be a charitable purpose if it is the means 
by which a charitable purpose referred to in s5(1) is pursued. 
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exemption of surpluses (in pursuit of their charitable aims) and also to be able to provide a tax credit 
to donors.9 In the 2011/2012 year, registration fees comprised 7% of the regulator's income (Charities 
Commission, 2012). Similar to other countries, the charities that have registered span a myriad of 
charitable aims, beneficiaries and size parameters. Charities are not required to take any form of 
incorporation; those that do may be established as a Charitable Trust, Incorporated Society, Limited 
Liability Company, or by a specific Act of Parliament. The liability of the members or 'owners' will be 
dependent on the incorporation chosen (if any).  
The Charities Commission was established with 15 required functions, and a Board of between five 
and seven members. Its main function is to 'promote public trust and confidence in the charitable 
sector' (Charities Act, 2005, s.10.1(a)). This purpose accords with the regulatory theory of requiring 
the maintenance of the public interest. There have been three measures of the achievement of this 
purpose. In 2008, a survey found that 58% of people had 'high trust' in charities with only 7% having 
'low trust' (UMR Research, 2010). However, while more people had heard of the Charities Commission 
in the 2010 survey, (67% of respondents compared with 57% two years before), respondents were 
less likely than the 2008 respondents to use the internet-based register to access charity information 
(Empathy & Charities Commission, 2010). Further, in 2010, only 55% of respondents had 'high trust', 
signalling no increase in public trust and confidence. The Charities Commission responded to this 
result by commissioning research into which attributes of charities engender public trust. Although 
the results of this second survey were shared widely with the charities sector to encourage better 
practice in communication and practice, the 2012 survey showed a further decline in public trust and 
confidence to 44% (UMR Research, 2012). Nevertheless, 55% of respondents stated that they trusted 
charities registered with the Charities Commission (UMR Research, 2012).  
Similarly to the Charity Act 2011 for England and Wales, the New Zealand's Charities Commission was 
                                                             
9  From 2010 a donation of over $5 to a charity with approved done status will allow the donor to claim a 
rebate of 33.33% (Income Tax Act, 2007, s.LD1). This rebate is up to a maximum of the donor’s taxable 
income (Tax Administration Act, 1994, s.41(A)).  
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also expected to 'encourage and promote the effective use of charitable resources' (Charities Act, 
2005, s.10.1(b)). Charities' filings are publicly available on the internet-based register. As it has been 
found that organizations with better internet disclosures of their finances fare best in the charitable 
contributions market (Saxton & Guo, 2011), this is an example of how the Charities Commission 
informed a market for charitable donations and government funds. For example the regulator 
highlighted specific Christchurch charities which donors could support after the earthquakes that hit 
that city in late 2010 and 2011. Further, it instigated an 'open data' project encouraging software 
developers to mine charities' annual returns. While this allowed the Charities Commission to meet 
one of its ancillary requirements (to 'stimulate and promote research into any matter relating to 
charities' Charities Act, 2005 s.10(1)(m)), it is also likely that this could result in a commentator similar 
to Better Business Bureau's Wise Giving establishing itself in New Zealand.  
The third major function of the Commission was to 'educate and assist charities in relation to matters 
of good governance' (Charities Act 2005, s.10(c)). This may be seen as an extension of the desire of 
the regulator to make charities more efficient. It is also an example of the light-handed compliance 
approach rather than a deterrence approach to enforcing the regulator's requirements. The Charities 
Commission actively informed charities through face-to-face and internet-based media and worked 
with sector leaders to explain what good governance was. No measure of their success has been found. 
This light-handed approach also extended to charity filings. Charities are required to file an annual 
return within 6 months of their year-end along with a set of financial statements. While the 
computerised annual return has a number of boxes to complete, the accompanying financial reports 
can be in any format.  There was no active checking of the filings and, as there is no requirement for 
an audit of the underlying financial reports (except for those in the charity’s own constitution), the 
quality of the information may have been compromised as explained below.   
Charities' financial reporting was analysed in New Zealand by Newberry (1993; 1992) and, similarly to 
Bird and Morgan-Jones's (1981) UK study, she found consistent failures in charity reporting (including 
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expensing of fixed assets, absence of appropriate financial statements and policies). Also similar to 
Bird and Morgan- Jones (1981), Newberry (1993; 1992) was concerned that many of these failures had 
not been highlighted by the charity's auditors.  More recent research undertaken by Hooper, Sinclair, 
Hui and Mataira (2008) and Sinclair (2011) also found charities' financial reports lacked appropriate 
information.  
Yet unlike the UK, New Zealand did not respond to Newberry's (1993; 1992) research by developing a 
specific charity accounting standard or SORP.10 The reasons are likely to be two-fold. First there was 
no charity regulator at the time to champion a reporting standard. Yet, once established, the New 
Zealand Charities Commission chose not to develop its own standards. This suggests an underlying 
constraint related to New Zealand's 'sector-neutral' or 'transaction-neutral' approach to its financial 
reporting standards setting which operated from 1994. Under this approach, for-profit and public and 
private nonprofit organizations were subject to the same financial reporting standards and private 
nonprofit organizations were also encouraged to produce nonfinancial information similar to that 
required of public sector nonprofit organizations (New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants, 
2006).  
The benefits of this sector-neutral approach included increased comparability between organizations 
(for example, foundations, charities with for-profit trading arms and social enterprises). It allowed for 
a common understanding of accountability across all preparers, whether they were public or private, 
for-profit or nonprofit. Also, by taking a sector-neutral approach, standard setters' effort was 
minimised in respect of the small 'market' of charity reporters compared to the larger ‘markets’ of 
public and private sector organizations.  
Against these benefits was the drawback that New Zealand charities were denied a regime that was 
specifically developed for them. Accordingly, there were a number of charity-specific issues which 
                                                             
10  While a practice guide was produced for all nonprofit organizations (R100), it was expensive, relatively 
unknown and had few users. 
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were not covered by the reporting standards. These omissions included accounting for fund-raising 
and the extrapolation of relevant ratios, and guidance on accounting for tagged and untagged legacies 
and bequests.  Explanatory advice was developed on the treatment of these issues and the advice 
linked to the NZ IFRS (standards based on International Financial Reporting Standards), although these 
standards were mandatory only for large charities with assets greater than NZ$30million. 11 
Nevertheless, in 2011, the new accounting standards regulator (the External Reporting Board) 
announced a move away from sector-neutrality and the future development of financial reporting 
standards specifically for not-for-profit entities (External Reporting Board, 2011). These standards are 
likely to be mandated for charities (New Zealand Government, 2012b). Further, the Charities 
Commission was disestablished in June 2012 and subsumed into the Department of Internal Affairs 
with reduced autonomy. This research was a timely analysis of the former Charities Commission.  
3.1 The New Zealand research 
The objective of this paper is to ascertain the impact of a light-handed charity regime on small and 
medium charities' reporting. Thus, publicly available data from charities’ annual returns to the 
Charities Commission was accessed, as well as the financial reports charities filed contemporaneously.  
This research was supported by the Charities Commission who provided raw annual return data for 
400 randomly selected charities from their database. Two hundred of those charities had annual 
expenditure of less than NZ$40,000 and the remainder had expenditure between NZ$40,000 and 
NZ$2,000,000. These ranges were selected as they are the ranges proposed for “small” and “medium” 
charities in the Financial Reporting Bill (New Zealand Government, 2012b). 12  From this list, 300 
charities were selected for further study (150 from small and 150 from medium charities), to include 
charities that were dispersed across regions and charitable aims. Following the downloading of the 
                                                             
11  At the time of writing, the NZ Dollar was worth 0.55 UK Pounds and 0.83 US Dollars. 
12  It is proposed that charities with expenditure of less than $40,000 should be allowed to report on a cash 
basis, while those with expenditure between $40,000 and $2million should be allowed to follow “Simple 
Format Reporting” – a simplified accruals standard. The External Reporting Board’s proposed standards for 
these entities can be accessed at www.xrb.govt.nz.  
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charities’ financial reports from the Charities Commission (www.charities.govt.nz), the efficacy of the 
charities’ filings of summary financial data was checked against their statements to ascertain whether 
the charity compiled its financial accounts using a cash or accrual basis. Each charity’s rules were 
analysed with respect to its requirement for assurance and the Charities Commission filing searched 
for any non-financial information that might aid understanding of the charities’ activities and 
performance. Where charities had not filed non-financial information, the charity was contacted and 
requested to send any non-financial data they provided for their members and other stakeholders (for 
example at an Annual General Meeting). Data received was then included in the analysis. This research 
was undertaken between November 2010 and February 2011. It included charities’ financial reports 
for years ended 2009 or 2010 but that were filed in 2010.  
3.2 Results 
As noted, charities’ filings around the world have been beleaguered by errors and omissions.13 In this 
research, over 61% (184) of the 300 filings also contained errors or omissions. Table 1 shows the 
general categories of these filing errors and the number of filings that were affected. Errors were 
counted as being present or not present (‘1’ or ‘0’). Therefore, where the same error occurred more 
than once in a charity’s filing it was counted only once, rather than as multiple occurrences.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The most common of the general errors reported in Table 1 was that the figures filed did not match 
the charity's financial reports (24% or 72 charities). The next most common error was missing figures, 
followed by figures filed with the correct numbers, but with the thousand(‘000’)’s missing so they 
were in the wrong category of small, medium or large.14  These errors resulted in the definitions of 
the charity sample changing due to the actual expenditure being different from that filed, so that the 
                                                             
13  See for example, from the UK: Morgan (2011), OSCR (2010), and from North America (the US and Canada): 
Froelich and Knoepfle (1996), Keating and Frumkin (2003) and Ayer, Hall and Vodarek (2009). 
14  The Charities Commission amended its form in early 2010 to require charities to include dollars and cents 
rather than, as previously, expecting them to round to the closest thousand.  
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final sample included 140 small and 160 medium-sized charities (rather than 150 of each). 
 
Froelich and Knoepfle (1996) offer an explanation for errors in US filings, stating that the person who 
completes the charity filing had little or no accounting knowledge. As filing requires the charity to 
undertake classification and reduction of the financial statements in order to fit the required 
categories, if filers lack accounting knowledge errors could eventuate. One New Zealand faith-based 
organization noted that 21% of their treasurers did not know whether their financial reporting was 
cash or accrual based and 19% of their treasurers had no qualification whatsoever (a further 14% did 
not indicate whether they were qualified or not and 15% stated they were not qualified as accountants 
but had other qualifications).15  
 
The form of the annual return template may exacerbate filing problems. For example, the term ‘gross 
income’ on the pro-forma template created two types of errors; some charities did not disclose other 
income in their filings as, since the template asked for ‘total gross income’, they took the income after 
cost of goods sold figure (often called gross income), and omitted other income. This error also 
occurred with a filing whose financial reports had ‘gross income’ as a separate heading to ‘other 
income’ and hence ‘other income’ was omitted. Further, some terms were ambiguous. For example, 
‘cost of service provision’ and ‘cost of trading operations’ was interpreted by some charities as 
meaning the cost for them to provide their service (or for them to trade) and classified their expenses 
accordingly. Others interpreted it as the cost for them to receive services (or for them to receive 
goods). The vast majority of charities omitted figures from these two categories, disclosing separately 
only wages, depreciation and interest with the remainder of their expenses filed as ‘all other 
expenditure’, but it was unclear as to whether they had expenditure within this category. Keating and 
Frumkin (2003) found similar problems with the US Form 990 in that the filing requirements did not 
comply with GAAP and therefore the filer needed to ‘translate’ their financial reports to comply with 
                                                             
15  Personal email to author from Van Hout. 
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the regulator's demands. 
 
From Table 1 it can be seen that financial reporting errors were also significant; the most common 
error in this category was that charities told the regulator that their financial reports were prepared 
on a cash basis, when on examination of their financial reports we found they were actually prepared 
on an accrual basis (this affected 77 charities of the 184 who filed errors, or 25.6% of charities). Table 
2 shows more detail on where the errors lie for the 72 charities that had incorrect financial reporting. 
It can be seen that, while there was a small number of charities that did not provide an Income and 
Expenditure statement or Balance Sheet (when they had prepared financial statements on an accrual 
basis), the majority of errors arose from a disagreement of particular totals (Equity in 31% of filings; 
Surplus/Deficit in 24% of filings). This is a much higher rate than was found by Froelich, et al (2000) in 
the US where balance sheets were incorrect in only 1% of their sample and only 1% income and 
expenditure statements were incorrect.   
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 2 also shows that the errors in financial report filings by small charities are not substantially 
different from those of medium-sized charities. However, more than 76% of the errors in accounting 
basis (where charities filed accrual accounts but stated they were cash) occurred in charities that had 
less than $120,000 in expenditure. Further, 26% of the total errors were found in charities with 
expenditure between $0 and $10,000. 
Thirdly, we found that, although a majority (65.9%) of charities filed their returns within the deadline, 
these charities were more likely to be medium-sized (70.5%) than small (60.8%). It can be seen in Table 
3 that 102 (34.1%) of charities filed their financial statements more than 6 months after their year end.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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Almost 44% of medium-sized charities and 30% of small charities filed their financial statements in the 
sixth month after their year-end. The high number of filings during the sixth month can be explained 
by a last minute influx to meet the submission deadline. Equally, the high number of filings during the 
seventh month is likely due to charities receiving a warning letter from the Charities Commission.16  
4. Discussion 
The former New Zealand Charities regulator appeared to meet the two roles identified by public 
interest theory. First, it was tasked with reducing information asymmetry in order to enhance 
charities' accountability and therefore to increase public trust and confidence. Yet, research 
undertaken by the Charities Commission shows there has been a decline in trust and confidence in 
charities in New Zealand (Empathy & Charities Commission, 2010; UMR Research, 2010, 2012).  
Further, the sample of charity filings analysed in this project showed that filings with the regulator 
contained a high rate of errors, as do the contemporaneously filed financial reports. These errors were 
not limited to small charities, but were general across the whole sample of charities with less than 
$2million in expenditure. This finding is at odds with the suggestions by Salterio and Legresley (2010) 
and Froelich et al. (2000) who hypothesised that smaller charities may be better at financial reporting 
than medium-sized charities as they have simpler reporting needs. Although the findings are limited 
by the random sample chosen, they confirm that small charities lack expertise (as also shown by Burt 
& Taylor, 2004; Froelich & Knoepfle, 1996). This is also borne out by the informal research undertaken 
by Van Hout17. Another factor in the lack of good quality reporting is the lack of a specific charity 
accounting regime in New Zealand, brought about by the sector-neutral focus of the accounting 
regulators and the paucity of advice on charity-specific matters.   
                                                             
16  Late filers could also be de-registered, but there is a lack of enthusiasm for this, given that a charity could 
receive the benefits of registration and then de-register and distribute its surpluses however it pleases. 
17  Personal communication with author, September 20, 2011. 
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However, against the similarity between small and medium-sized charities with respect to ordinary 
financial report errors, of the 34.1% of charities that filed their returns outside of the required time, 
small charities were worse (39.2%) compared to medium-sized charities (29.5%). We noted a rush to 
file following the receipt of a reminder letter. Such reminder letters are dependent on the regulator's 
resources, yet in working with a compliance approach, the Charities Commission chose a method of 
operation which was likely to reduce the resources it had available to 'police' charities.  
The light handed compliance approach (rather than deterrence) used by the New Zealand Charities 
Commission prioritised proactive education and balancing of costs and benefits, so that small and 
medium charities had few obligations, except to file simple reports. While this may have reduced the 
regulatory cost on these charities, these research results show that the light-handed regime (highly 
voluntary) did not result in an increase of transparency and accountability in these charities. This is 
likely to be a reason for the lack of an increase in the donating public's trust and confidence. Hind 
(2011) might suggest that the CCEW’s work is akin to regulating angels, yet the compliance approach 
does not appear to have succeeded in New Zealand. The reticence of the regulator to develop a 
charity-specific reporting regime and/or the slowness of the accounting regulator to do likewise is also 
likely to have impacted the success of the regulator in meeting its aim to develop good reporting 
practices.  
The second reason for regulation is to create a market place (Gaffikin, 2005). By publishing the annual 
returns and financial information of all charities, the New Zealand Charities Commission presented 
data from all registered charities to any potential donor or funder. The instigation of the 'open data' 
project further delivered information to software developers and those seeking to mine the data 
which is available. In this, the New Zealand regulator showed itself to be more proactive than other 
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regulators, such as the CCEW that provides charity financial reports only on demand18 and the OSCR 
which does not publish data at all, but invites interested parties to write to the charity concerned.  
A third aspect of the New Zealand regime that is not shared by UK Charity regulators is that charities 
share the cost of the regulator. Theorists would suggest that this cost sharing is likely to increase the 
risk that the regulator may become captured by charities, but we hypothesise that this will not occur 
due to the diverse nature of the charities sector, the small registration fee, and the large number and 
range of users.  Notwithstanding charities’ inputs to the costs of the regulator, from 1 July 2012 the 
Charities Commission’s core functions were moved to a government department (the Department of 
Internal Affairs (DIA)) and the independent Commission disestablished in an effort to reduce 
government’s administration costs. This is despite the evidence to suggest that the former Charities 
Commission was under-resourced (similar to the CCEW in various periods of its existence) and that 
more resources were required to improve its performance. Public statements suggest that changes to 
DIA Charities operations will be minimised, but that the focus is on new registration and de-
registration processes. While some advocacy groups who had previously been denied registration (or 
been de-registered) have progressed cases to be registered, (for example, Greenpeace of New Zealand 
Incorporated v Charities Commission [2012] NZCA 533), sector umbrella groups (for example, 
Association of Non-Governmental Organisations of Aotearoa, 2012) expressed distrust that a 
government department would now be regulating the independent charities sector.  
5. Conclusion   
There continues to be a debate about the appropriate role of regulation in the charity sector (for 
example, Burt & Taylor, 2004; Hind, 2011). Regulators may represent little more than increased costs 
to those who are regulated, but, under public interest theory, they may also reduce information 
asymmetry and can be used to create a more efficient charity 'market'. It appears that New Zealand's 
                                                             
18  However, the CCEW’s 2010/11 annual report notes that it is reviewing how it publishes and shares 
information on charities.  
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Charities Commission was established with these precepts in mind; however, this study has shown 
that the light-handed nature of its activities has resulted in the regulator not achieving its aims. There 
are high levels of asymmetry in charities’ financial reporting, as shown by the errors in the filings they 
make, and therefore the aim to inspire public trust and confidence has not been achieved, nor are a 
significant minority of charities being accountable to their users. 
Similar problems with the reliability of charities’ financial reports have been highlighted in a number 
of jurisdictions. Specifically, filings are not compliant with the allowed regime (GAAP, or a specific cash 
basis) and filings lack totals and segmentation especially where expenses and revenues are sensitive 
(e.g. fundraising). Sinclair (2011) suggests this can be attributed to charities’ desire to ‘look poor’. A 
second argument is that charities lack expertise to file appropriately presented financial statements. 
There is little research on capacity in this area, and it would be useful to extend this research with 
qualitative data on capacity and willingness to complete regulatory filing, not only in New Zealand, 
but also internationally.  
The New Zealand Charities Commission developed methods to market charities to donors and thus 
prioritised the marketplace rather than the reduction of information asymmetry and an increase in 
information quality and comparability. However, due to its light-handed approach, the information it 
provided to this market was likely to be flawed. Thus its position as a regulator was undermined and 
did not lead to an increase in public trust and confidence in the charitable sector. The findings of this 
research show how necessary it is for charity regulators to utilise minimum reporting standards, 
and/or to utilise deterrence methods rather than light-handed compliance methods, to increase the 
likelihood that charities will discharge their accountability in a transparent manner. 
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